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The Platonic Origin of an Ideal
V. Bradley Lewis*
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C Context and Limits of the Rule of Law
D. The Nightly Meeting and the Higher Law of Reason
III. FROM PLATO TO ARISTOTLE AND BEYOND
The rule of law is taken by almost every thoughtful student of politics
and law as an important value, even as a defining mark of legitimate
political order.' The rule of law has often been defended as a way of
safeguarding individual freedom by protecting rational expectations and
maximizing efficiency.2 But the ideal of the rule of law as an objective of
legal systems goes beyond this and is now usually taken to require that laws
be open, clear, coherent, prospective, and stable. Moreover, such laws
should be enforced consistently by government and be subject to
adjudication.' Defenses and expositions of the rule of law do not usually
appeal to a higher law, whether natural or divine. Some early modem
attempts, like that of Locke, do seem to root the value of the rule of law in
something like the natural law,4 but it is an explicitly reduced modem
version of the natural law, one rooted more in very basic goods like self-
* Associate Professor, School of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America. B.A.
University of Maryland; M.A., Ph.D. University of Notre Dame.
1. For two recent examples, see FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL
DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD 17, 37-38, 55, 77, 156 (2003), and LARRY DIAMOND, THE
SPIRIT OF DEMOCRACY: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD FREE SOCIETIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 21-
22, 165-66 (2008).
2. See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 153 (1960).
3. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (rev. ed. 1969); TIMOTHY A.O.
ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW (2000).
4. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OFGOVERNMENT §§ 6,11-12,124-26,128-31 (1690).
preservation and not in more fulsome accounts of human flourishing.5 Such
a view is not unrelated to the "natural law" tradition, but it is hard to see as
"higher" law.
In more recent times, Lon Fuller famously tried to defend the natural
law against legal positivism by describing what he called the "internal
morality of law.",6 While Fuller's account of the characteristics of the rule
of law is now accepted as canonical, his larger argument has been widely
adjudged a failure in two ways: First, to show that a polity enjoys the rule of
law is not to show that the laws are good or even that the polity is good, and
absent such a connection, Fuller's account fails to vindicate the natural law.7
Second, Fuller's account never says much about the character of the natural
law, explicitly distinguishing his view from the traditional Catholic one and
suggesting at the end of his book a quite vague idea of the natural law as
largely procedural in nature. 8 No one doubts the value of the rule of law,
but does its defense necessarily entail affirmation of something like the
natural law? Fuller's account left things unclear.
This question becomes particularly important when one thinks about the
alternatives to the rule of law, a question less frequently considered.
Timothy Endicott has recently discussed the rule of law in the context of a
study, of the challenge posed to the ideal by vagueness, concluding that the
rule of law is always realized in imperfect ways and that vagueness as such
cannot defeat it. 9 In considering the alternatives to the rule of law, however,
Endicott only mentions anarchy and arbitrariness. 10  But the classical
defense of the rule of law was predicated on its inferiority to one particular
alternative seldom considered by contemporary legal philosophers: the
unrestricted rule of reason combined with moral virtue, what one might call
for short the rule of the virtuous wise." There are remnants of this
alternative in modem and contemporary thought, most importantly in the
recognition of the need for extraordinary powers during serious political
5. See LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 220-34 (1953).
6. FULLER, supra note 3, at 33-94.
7. See H.L.A. Hart, Book Review, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1965) (reviewing LON L. FULLER,
THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964)); Ronald Dworkin, Philosophy, Morality, and Lm-Observations
Prompted by Professor Fuller's Novel Claim, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 668 (1965); Marshall Cohen, Law,
Morality, and Purpose, 10 VILL. L. REV. 640 (1965); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, 93
LAW Q. REV. 195 (1977).
8. See FULLER, supra note 3, at 18-19, 96-98, 184-86; cf Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and
Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REV. 630, 660 (1958).
9. See ENDICOTT, supra note 3, at 185-203.
10. Id. at 186-87.
11. See E.A. Goerner, Letter and Spirit: The Political Ethics of the Rule of Law Versus the
Political Ethics of the Rule of the Virtuous, 45 REV. POL. 553 (1983) (considering this alternative in
a contemporary context).
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crises, 12 the equitable jurisdiction of courts,13 and the "political questions"
doctrine in American constitutional jurisprudence. 14 These are all instances
of limitations of law with respect to the variability of human affairs and the
necessity for particular human judgments as distinct from settled rules. 5
The theoretical argument for the rule of law has a long history in the
West, and the further back one goes, the closer one gets to an explicit
connection with something like "higher law." There is an explicit
connection at the very beginning of the tradition, but it entails an often
overlooked aspect. While we can find the earliest arguments for the rule of
law in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, it is perhaps even more striking to
those of us trained in the view of the rule of law simply as a kind of ideal
that the classical authors saw it as a second-best solution to a larger problem.
Indeed, they are just as aware of its drawbacks as of its advantages. For the
classics, the ideal is the rule of reason or intelligence, and the rule of law is a
kind of necessary compromise of that. We can see this most clearly
illustrated in the writings of Plato. In what follows, I try to excavate this
tradition by looking at two parts of Plato's account: his argument for the
priority of the rule of the virtuous wise in the Republic 16 and his argument
for the rule of law in his less often read Laws.' 7 It is important that the rule
of law is more complicated than often noticed. Law does not simply rule on
its own but is intelligible and made possible by a context of challenges and
supports. The rule of law is difficult to successfully establish and difficult to
maintain absent a supporting culture. Such a culture includes opinions that
back the efficacy of law and other quasi-legal practices and habits. It also
requires both a disinclination to change law and a means of doing so when
necessary. These are all parts of Plato's argument in the Laws, and they
reveal frequently overlooked aspects of what is often taken to be something
12. See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 5, at §§ 156-68; JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Du CONTRAT
SOCIAL bk. 4, ch. 6 (1762); see also JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 273-76
(1980) (providing a contemporary discussion).
13. I mean "equity" in the sense typically contrasted to "law," i.e., "[tjhe recourse to principles
of justice to correct or supplement the law as applied to particular circumstances." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 560 (7th ed. 1999). See also Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1993, at 53 (arguing strongly that the law-equity distinction is no longer
tenable and that equity is now simply a part of law).
14. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
15. There are also the much controverted issues concerning the scope and limits on judicial
interpretation and of discretion in adjudication. Although I am not concerned with them here, they
too are relevant.
16. See infra Part 1.
17. See infra Part II.
of a commonplace. It is also important throughout that the second-best
standard of the rule of law retains its connection with the simply best: the
rule of reason. In the concluding section, I briefly look at how the Platonic
notion made its way through the thought of Aristotle to the most celebrated
natural law account, that of Saint Thomas Aquinas.' 8
I. THE RULE OF REASON IN THE SOCRATIC CITY
Plato famously has Socrates argue for the rule of philosophers in the
Republic.'9 While the extent to which reason is to operate unfettered by law
in that work is sometimes overstated, it is clear that law is secondary. 20 The
ideal is a city in which reason is in control of the sub-rational elements of the
human soul both in the lives of the rulers and, through their rule, in the life
of the city as a whole. This entails a critical account of the rule of law that
appears in the very first book of the Republic when Socrates discusses
justice with the elderly Cephalus.2' Cephalus notes that the best thing about
being wealthy is that one need never engage in injustice, specifically
cheating and lying.22 Socrates responds by asking Cephalus if that is what
he thinks justice itself (dikaiosunj hapl5s) is, "the truth and giving back
what a man has taken from another., 23  Cephalus agrees, prompting
Socrates's famous counter-example of the man who comes in a state of
madness to a friend who has borrowed from him a weapon and asks for its
return. 24 Should we say it is just to return the weapon or to tell the truth to
such a man (for example, about the whereabouts of one of his enemies when
he is in that state and armed)? 25 At this point, a perplexed Cephalus passes
the discussion on to his son, Polemarchus, and leaves the house to resume
his sacrifices, leaving the reader with questions about Cephalus's life and,
more importantly, about how his definition ofjustice goes wrong.26
What Socrates's objection suggests is not that justice does not (in some
sense) require one to return property borrowed from another or that one tell
the truth but rather that insofar as we think of justice as a virtue, and thus as
good, it cannot simply be the quasi-mechanical application of rules. Rules
18. See infra Part Ill.
19. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books 2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter THE
REPUBLIC].
20. See V. Bradley Lewis, Politeia kai Nomoi: On the Coherence of Plato's Political Philosophy,
31 POLITY 331 (1998).
21. THE REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 328b-3 Id.
22. Id. at 331b.
23. Id. at 331c.
24. Id. at 331c-d.
25. The example has become a canonical one. See, e.g., ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA Ilallae, q. 57, art. 2, adl.
26. THE REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 33 1d.
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never completely capture what the virtue itself requires and thus can fall
short of goodness. Goodness is the real (implied) standard of conduct and
what is missing from a merely legalistic account of justice.27 The definition
is not so much false as incomplete, and the long inquiry that it begins aims
to understand its incompleteness in light of a better account of justice, one
that ultimately points at a kind of life and a kind of political community
ordered by reason and the good. The desirability of such a thing is justified
in terms of the starkest vision of reason's priority in human affairs and in the
face of man's naturally political character unified by a dubious analogy
between the structure of the city and that of the human soul. It issues in the
(in)famous proposal for a city ruled by a group of communist polygamist
philosophers and their "auxiliaries"-in fact, soldiers-associated with the
spiritedness necessary for their art. The mass of the population is associated
with mere physical desire and material productivity.
28
The arrangement is explained by way of the well-known "noble lie"
about each person having been born with one of three types of metal in his
or her soul indicating position in the city's hierarchy: gold for the
philosopher-rulers, silver for the auxiliary/soldiers, and bronze for the
farmer and artisan majority.29 Perhaps the more important aspects of the lie,
however, are first, that it ties the inhabitants of the city closely together,
holding that all are children of the same mother, the earth itself, on which
the city rests, thus binding them equally to the land; and second, that it
indicates a natural but uneven distribution of ruling intelligence. In this
sense the myth simultaneously indicates the aspirations of the city for unity
as a city and the limitations on this aspiration given by human nature, and
tries to effect a solution, albeit one requiring a fatal compromise of the truth.
The program is a practical impossibility, a fact revealed clearly, if
indirectly, in a number of statements by Socrates, including
acknowledgments that the proposals would require massive and thorough
purges of the city,3° as well as the incongruity of founding the best political
regime on lies31 and then setting up as its administrators philosophers who
are explicitly said to have "no taste for falsehood., 3 2  This is similarly
27. For discussion of these issues in the context of the Republic, see LEO STRAUSS, THE CITY
AND MAN 67-69 (1964), and DEVIN STAUFFER, PLATO'S INTRODUCTION TO THE QUESTION OF
JUSTICE 19-26 (2001).
28. THE REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 428b-33b, 442a-b.
29. Id. at414b-15e.
30. Id. at 501a, 541a.
31. Id. at 376e-77b, 382a-d, 459c-d.
32. Id. at 485c.
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indicated by the generally mocking comic tone of the fifth book, where the
most outrageous innovations are mooted.33 Socrates also cautions his
interlocutors that the program is a "pattern in speech" (paradeigma en logoi)
and that it is "the nature of acting to attain to less truth than speaking," and
concludes his explicit political discussion by cautioning that the city
described in the dialogue is a "pattern" for a man to found in his own soul:
"It doesn't make any difference whether it is or will be somewhere." 34
The point of the Republic is not to propose an actual city, contrary to a
conventional textbook interpretation of the dialogue. It is rather to
understand the very real tensions between the life of philosophy and the city,
tensions in human nature itself between man as a rational and political
animal, to use formulations associated with Aristotle. The problem at the
heart of the Republic is the problem Plato saw very concretely in the
confrontation between Socrates and the Athenians. Man needs the city, the
political community: it is a response in the first instance to his bodily needs,
as Socrates points out,3 5 although not limited to this, because the satisfaction
of basic needs makes possible the leisured cultivation of man's higher
powers. But those powers of the soul, especially mind, come into tension
with the local, bodily nature of the city, aimed as they are ultimately at
knowledge of "all time and all being."3 6 The strength of the city requires
stability and widely shared consensus rooted in the opinions of the non-
philosophical majority and the loyalty of the soldiers to that order.37 There
is then a necessary tension between the city and the philosopher, between
opinion and knowledge, between body and mind, and between deed and
speech. The "beautiful city" (kallipolis)38 of the Republic imagines a
solution to these tensions based on the superiority and freedom of reason,
but the bizarre institutions and impossible strategies required to establish the
city point to the impossibility of the project. These tensions, the Republic
suggests, cannot be resolved.
The Republic contains no account of the higher law as such. But its
fundamental thesis is far from unconnected to the notion of a higher law, if
we identify such a law with reason, because the superiority of the
unconstrained rule of reason is at the heart of the Republic. A problem
emerges when we notice that the rule of reason is indeed contrasted in
varous ways to thc rule of law. in classical Greek thought generally, this
33. In one section of the fifth book, variants of words for "ridiculous" (geloios) appear some
seventeen times! Id. at 451a-57b. The discussion is likely meant to allude to Aristophanes's
comedy, Assemblywomen. See Allan Bloom, Response to Hall, 5 POL. THEORY 315 (1977).
34. THE REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 472e-73a, 592a-b.
35. Id. at 369b-70a.
36. Id. at 486a.
37. Id. at 376e-83c, 429b-30c.
38. The city is referred to this way. Id. at 527c; cf. 543d-44a.
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was rooted in the ubiquitous contrast between nomos and phusis, law or
convention, and nature.3 9
Nature (phusis) indicates what is the case always and everywhere apart
from human intention or intervention. Law or convention (nomos) indicates
what is the case when agreed to by human beings. 40 Nature is an object of
knowledge; law is a product of human art. The arts, however, take place
against the backdrop of nature and cooperate with it, and so law as the
product of art can follow nature. But the original insight here was one of
contrast, and that contrast was clear to Socrates and Plato. This is indicated
in part by the very etymology and usage of the word. Nomos has its origins
in an Indo-European root (nem-) that means distribution, but one of the later
meanings of the verb form, nomiz5, can mean either "to recognize as law,"
or simply, "to believe.' Indeed, the charge against Socrates that he did not
believe in the gods of the city employed this usage.42
This usage is important in the Republic as well. In the fifth book,
Socrates makes his most radical proposals: that women train for war and
ruling alongside men equally, that children be raised communally, and that
the ruling class of the city be composed of philosophers.43 The question
then occurs: Who are the philosophers? The immediate answer is that they
are lovers-lovers of wisdom, of leaming, and of truth.44 The truth is what
is stable and permanent behind appearances and thus is the basis of real
knowledge. 45  Knowledge is distinguished from mere opinion in that it is
based on the forms or ideas and thus "always stays the same in all respects,"
unlike the many appearances. 46 Socrates concludes: "Then we have found,
as it seems, that the many beliefs [(nomima)] of the many about what's fair
and about the other things roll around somewhere between not-being and
being purely and simply."'47 The word for beliefs here, nomima, is the same
word often used for "customs" or "conventions" and is closely related to the
39. The classic survey is FELIX HEINIMANN, NOMOS UND PHYSIS: HERKUNFT UND BEDEUTUNG
EINER ANTITHESE IM GRIECHISCHEN DENKEN DES 5. JAHRHUNDERTS (1965).
40. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1134b18-27 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett Publ'g
Co. 2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter NICOMACHEAN ETHICS].
41. See EMMANUEL LAROCHE, HISTOIRE DE LA RACINENEM- EN GREC ANCIEN (1949); PIERRE
CHANTRAINE, DICTIONNAIRE ETYMOLOGIQUE DE LA LANGUE GRECQUE: HISTOIRE DES MOTS 742-
44(1974).
42. PLATO, APOLOGY OF SOCRATES 24b-c.
43. THE REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 457a, 457c-d, 474c-d.
44. Id. at 474c, 475b-d.
45. Id. at 476d-77a.
46. Id. at 479a.
47. Id. at 479d.
usual word for law in the stronger sense of "statute," nomos.48 Law, then, as
Plato indicates elsewhere, is a kind of opinion and is accepted by people as
opinions are.
One of the other places where Plato indicates this is in the brief dialogue
Minos, which is often regarded as a kind of introduction to the Laws. 49 The
Minos considers the very basic question, "What is law?" Socrates's
interlocutor there, a nameless "companion," defines law as the "opinion of
the city."50 He and Socrates then consider what sort of opinion law could be
and conclude that it must be a valuable opinion, meaning one that saves or
preserves the city.51 Such opinions, if they are really valuable, must be true,
and thus Socrates redefines law as "wishing to be the discovery of what
iS.9,52is. ' 2
There are two initial questions one might ask in reply to such a
formulation. First, is the value of a political opinion simply a function of its
truth? Second, to assert that law "wishes to be the discovery of what is"
suggests that law aims at the same thing as philosophy. But to assert that
thesis is immediately to bring to mind many ways in which it cannot be. For
one thing, law is rigid and universal in form, the better to allow people to
form stable plans and expectations and in order to cover a wide variety of
particular cases. The point of identifying the end of law with that of
philosophy seems to be that of displaying to anyone with even a modicum of
knowledge of the two that they cannot simply share that aim and to point out
the difference and tension between the two. At the same time, this
formulation suggests the necessary connection between any law that can be
seen as just and useful, and other truths about human affairs. One can see
both the connection and the tension in the Minos.
It is, however, the Republic that shows these tensions most directly
because it imagines the perfectly rational philosophical city, one that is, to
the highest degree possible, without law and according to nature. 3 In so
doing, it suggests the inadequacy of law to achieve perfect justice but also
the impossibility of philosophy to rule either consistently with itself or in a
way adequate to the city. What we have then is the exposition of a tension
rooted in human nature between man's rational and political capacities-
48. Nomos came to have this predominant meaning by the mid-fourth century B.C. See MARTIN
OSTWALD, NOMOS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY (1969).
49. See V. Bradley Lewis, Plato's Minos: The Political and Philosophical Context of the
Problem of Natural Right, 60 REv. METAPHYSICS 17 (2006).
50. PLATO, MINOS 314b-c (translation by author).
51. Id at 314c--e.
52. ld at 315a (translation by author).
53. In the initial discussion of the origins of the city in the second book of the Republic, the word
nature and its cognates are used frequently. See, e.g., THE REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 370a, 370c,
374e, 375c, 375e, 376c.
638
[Vol. 36: 631, 2009] Higher Law and the Rule of Law
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
between the highest human possibility and the necessary supports for man's
ordinary life. If the higher law is reason, then that law both informs the
heavenly paradigm of the perfectly just city and suggests its practical
impossibility. The tensions cannot be eliminated. Can they be managed,
and if so, how? That is the question posed by Plato's much more concretely
political work, the Laws.
II. PLATO'S SECOND-BEST CITY AND THE RULE OF LAW
A. The Project of the Laws
In the Laws, Plato presents a conversation between three elderly men: a
nameless Athenian, a Cretan named Kleinias, and Megillus, a Spartan.
5 4
The three are on a pilgrimage from the Cretan city of Knossos to the cave
and temple of Zeus on Mount Ida, where the god is said to have instructed
his son, Minos, in the art of legislation, allowing him to promulgate the best
and most enduring laws-laws still used by the Cretans and imitated by the
Spartans. 5 The pilgrimage, then, is not simply religious but intellectual, a
pilgrimage to the origin of law, which is a human encounter with the divine.
The theme of the dialogue is not so much law in a definitional sense, for no
clear definition is ever discussed, as it is the rule of law as a kind of
project. "
The dialogue falls into two obvious parts. The first three books are a
kind of theoretical introduction to problems of legislation and political order,
and it is here that the rule of law is introduced. At the conclusion of the
third book, Kleinias reveals that he is part of a commission appointed by the
Knossians to draw up a law code for a new colony.57 He proposes that his
two companions assist him by constructing a "city in speech."58  In the
remaining eight books, the project is carried out in great detail as the three
discuss the laws of a model city, the people of which are referred to as
Magnesians.
5 9
54. PLATO, THE LAWS (Thomas L. Pangle trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1988) [hereinafter THE
LAWS].
55. Id. at 683a; cf HERODOTUS 1.65; STRABO, GEOGRAPHY 10.4.17, 19; PLUTARCH, LIFE OF
LYCURGUS 4.1-2.
56. See Lewis, supra note 49 (discussing the nature of law as addressed in Minos).
57. THE LAWS, supra note 54, at 702a-d.
58. Id. at 702b-e.
59. Id. at 848d, 860e, 919d, 946b, 969a. There was an actual city called Magnesia in Asia Minor
that claimed kinship with an earlier Cretan Magnesia, long gone by the time Plato wrote the Laws,
although it may have been something of an inspiration. See GLENN R. MORROW, PLATO'S CRETAN
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Many have taken the Laws to represent a development of Plato's
political ideas, indeed, a repudiation of the ideal of the Republic.60 The two
cities, Kallipolis and Magnesia, are different, but I take the differences less
as a matter of doctrinal change than as representing a difference of intention.
The two dialogues do different things but not in a way that need imply
conflict or contradiction; they are complementary, investigating things in a
mutually illuminating manner. The Athenian stranger gives the best
statement of this difference in the fifth book of the Laws. The three men
have been discussing the conditions necessary for establishing the city,
specifically the distribution of land. 61 The Athenian refers to the city under
discussion as "second-best" (deuteros).62 A good legislator, he says, states
what the best regime is and then the second, third, and so on. 63 The best
regime would be one in which everything is common, including women,
children, and property. 64 He goes on:
If this situation exists somewhere now, or if it should ever exist
someday-if women are common, and children are common, and
every sort of property is common; if every device has been
employed to exclude all of what is called the "private" from all
aspects of life; if, insofar as possible, a way has been devised to
make common somehow the things that are by nature private, such
as the eyes and the ears and the hands, so that they seem to see and
hear and act in common; if, again, everyone praises and blames in
unison, as much as possible delighting in the same things and
feeling pain at the same things, if with all their might they delight in
laws that aim at making the city come as close as possible to
unity-then no one will ever set down a more correct or better
definition than this of what constitutes the extreme as regards
virtue.65
This could be a description of the city discussed in the Republic, but not
exactly. For one thing, the radical communism described here is not applied
to the whole city in the Republic but only to the class of philosopher rulers
and soldier auxiliaries. Second, no mention is made in this passage of
philosophy or r-ale by philosophers. These two differences are perhaps
CITY: A HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 30-31(1993).
60. For bibliography and discussion of this issue, see Lewis, supra note 20, and V. Bradley
Lewis, The Seventh Letter and the Unity of Plato's Political Philosophy, 38 S.J. PHIL. 231 (2000).
61. THE LAWS, supra note 54, at 736c-38e.
62. Id. at 739a, e; cf id. at 807b.
63. Id. at 739a-b.
64. Id. at 739c.
65. Id. at 739c-d.
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related in this way: Socrates suggests in the Republic that the rule of
philosophers is a means of introducing the other necessary but radical
changes that characterize Kallipolis. 66 He also suggests, as noted above, that
the establishment of the rule of philosophy is a practical impossibility. If
that is the case-and that idea is already present in the Republic, not an
innovation from the Laws-then it makes sense to ignore that aspect of the
plan, especially before men like Kleinias and Megillus, political men whose
practical concerns are far from philosophy and who come from cities that
were notably unphilosophical. 67
B. The Need for the Rule of Law
The discussion begins with the Athenian asking his companions who is
held responsible for the Cretan and Spartan laws, "a god or some human
being. ' ' 68 They answer that it is in each case a god: Zeus in the case of Crete
and Apollo in the case of Sparta.69  The opening of the dialogue then
presumes a higher law in the most literal sense, a law made by gods. The
Athenian then asks what the purpose is for the Cretan laws concerning their
barracks meals, gymnastic training, and weapons and tactics used in war.
7°
Kleinias replies that the purpose of these institutions and practices is the
same as that of all the Cretan laws: victory in war.71 Minos saw the central
truth of politics as a truth about war. He "condemned the mindlessness of
the many, who do not realize that for everyone throughout the whole of life
an endless war exists against all cities., 72 He saw rather that "what most
humans call peace... [is] only a name; in fact, for everyone there always
exists by nature [(kata phusin)] an undeclared war among all cities. 73 The
Cretan lawgiver always legislated according to this principle because he saw
66. See DREW A. HYLAND, FINITUDE AND TRANSCENDENCE IN THE PLATONIC DIALOGUES 59-
86(1995).
67. In numerous sections, Plato suggests that Kleinias and Megillus are unphilosophical men.
See, e.g., THE LAWS, supra note 54, at 626b, 803c-04c, 89 1a. The Spartans and the Dorian cities of
Crete are also suggested to be unphilosophical. See, e.g., id. at 641c, 666e-67a, 708a; cf PLATO,
CRITO 52e-53a. It is perhaps significant for similar reasons that the philosophical aspect of
Kallipolis is also ignored in Aristotle's discussion of it in Politics. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. 2,
chps. 2-5 (Peter L. Phillips Simpson trans., Univ. N.C. Press 1997) [hereinafter POLITICS].
68. THE LAWS, supra note 54, at 624a.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 625c.
71. Id. at625d-e.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 626a.
that, without victory in war, all of the good things are lost to one's
enemies. 74 What one might call the "Cretan thesis," however, goes beyond
even this. The Athenian asks if it is the case that the perpetual war also
exists within cities-between neighborhoods, between households, between
individuals, and even within individuals. 75  Kleinias affirms this with
enthusiasm, saying that the Athenian has correctly seen that "all are enemies
of all in public, and in private each is an enemy of himself," so that the first
and greatest victory is victory over oneself.76 The thesis certainly had its
contemporary analogues: within the Platonic corpus we can recognize
elements in it articulated by Kallikles in the Gorgias77 and by Thrasymachos
in the Republic. 8 Something very like it is articulated by the representatives
of different cities in Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian War.79
It is a principle that the Athenian stranger immediately challenges. He
does this by initially asking what it could mean to describe one as superior
or inferior to oneself.8 This is difficult to answer about an individual, but
perhaps in the case of cities, it reflects whether better or worse men rule. He
proposes an analogy as a means of thinking about this: imagine a large
family with many brothers.8' More, the Athenian suggests, would likely be
unjust than just. 82 But now he dismisses the question of when we should
call such a family superior or inferior to itself as a matter of mere words, of
interest only to the many.83 The present inquiry should rather concern laws,
and the three elderly men should seek "whatever in them constitutes
correctness and faultiness according to nature" (phusei).84 So what begins
as the discussion of divine law by now has changed into a discussion of what
laws are according to nature. Can one still call this "higher" law? One
might better call it deeper law. Nature is taken to be a standard, one that
explains law but also transcends or, to stay with the sense of depth, underlies
the actual written laws of the city. What happens to the notion that the gods
are behind the law? That is a question to which we shall return below.
74. Id. at 626b.
75. Id. at 626b-27a.
76. Id. at 626c-e.
77. See PLATO, GORGIAS 483a-e.
78. See THE REPUBLIC, supra 19, at 338c-39a.
79. See, e.g., THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 1.76.2, 4.61.5, 5.105.2; cf
id. at 5.89.
80. THE LAWS, supra note 54, at 626e-27a.
81. Id. at 627c.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 627c-d.
84. Id. at 627d. I have discussed Plato's views on natural right generally in V. Bradley Lewis,
La raison qui entreprend de se faire loi: nature et Ioi dans les Lois de Platon, in DROIT NATUREL:
RELANCER L'HISTOIRE? 101 (Xavier Dijon ed. & trans., 2008).
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The Athenian then asks who an appropriate judge for the brothers would
be and proposes three options: first, a judge who would destroy the unjust
brothers and set the just up to rule themselves; second, a judge who would
destroy no one but would get the unjust to agree to be ruled by the just; and
third, a judge who would neither destroy anyone nor establish a permanent
ruling class but one "capable of... reconciling them by laying down laws
for them for the rest of time and thus securing their friendship for one
another."85
Notice two things about this proposal. First, the Athenian's view is
evidently grounded in nature. Nature is contrasted to mere words and thus
offers a more stable and trustworthy basis. But what does nature mean in
this context? For nature to be a standard it must be knowable. And that in
turn points back to the experiment of the Republic with rule by those who
know. Is that what the Athenian is aiming for here? Some initial answers
are in the three options suggested, and this is the second thing to notice.
One recognizes the three proposals as possible solutions to the political
problem as such. The first is a purge that attempts to eliminate injustice by
eliminating the unjust and, as it were, starting fresh. It has the advantage of
quite literally eliminating injustice but also the disadvantage of removing the
majority of the population and so rendering the city physically weaker than
it might be. The second is a kind of aristocracy and thus has the advantage
accruing to that form of government in which the virtuous rule. It has the
possible disadvantage of creating a permanent division in the city which
could also weaken it. Moreover, the best version of this solution would
presumably be the sort of city imagined in the Republic, and thus, the
reasons that render that city practically impossible tell against this one as
well. The third solution, the one chosen, has the advantage of avoiding the
first two problems but also has two characteristic disadvantages: in
accepting the permanent presence of the unjust, it dilutes the influence of
virtue in the city, settling for a kind of moral alloy, and it is subject to the
disadvantages of the rule of law-that the law is static and general in the
face of the almost infinite variety and complexity of human affairs.
This problem of abstraction and generality is one that Plato notes
elsewhere in the Laws and also in his dialogue, Statesman.86  That
dialogue-the last part of a trilogy comprised also of the Theaetetus and
Sophist, and concerned generally with problems about knowledge-takes
place between a mostly quiet Socrates and an Eleatic stranger. The stranger
85. THE LAWS, supra note 54, at 628a.
86. PLATO, STATESMAN, in THE BEING OF THE BEAUTIFUL III. 1 (Seth Benardete trans., 1984).
makes a point quite closely related to that of the Athenian stranger in the
passage quoted above-that genuine ruling knowledge is very rare and not
to be expected in even a small number of citizens.87 He holds the best sort
of rule to be that by one with knowledge "with laws or without laws" and
whether the subjects are willing or not.88 Socrates evinces discomfort with
the idea of rule without law (leaving aside the question of the willingness of
the subjects to be ruled), a discomfort the stranger indicates that he
expected.89 The stranger replies, "Although it's plain enough that in a
certain sense the legislative (art) belongs to the royal (art), the best thing is
not for the laws but for a man-the king with intelligence-to have
strength." 90 Socrates asks for more of an explanation and the stranger offers
the following:
[L]aw would never be capable of comprehending with precision for
all simultaneously the best and the most just and enjoining the best,
for the dissimilarities of human beings and of their actions and the
fact that almost none of the human things is ever at rest do not allow
any art whatsoever to declare in any case anything simple about all
and over the entire time. 91
Shortly thereafter, the same point is put more concisely: "Isn't it
impossible, then, for that which proves to be simple through all times to be
in a good condition relative to things that are never simple?" 92  This
constitutes the great and perennial criticism of the rule of law as distinct
from that of free intelligence. It is essentially a thesis about the extent to
which human affairs admit of certain knowledge fully adequate to practice.
The problem is not so much that there is no knowledge of the good to be had
but that the application of it via law-like generalizations is complicated by
the fact that every individual human being constitutes a variable. Human
things, therefore, are always moving targets of the mind. A living mind is
able to track them, but the law is not living and therefore never fully
adequate to its object.93
To return to the Laws, then, and the Athenian's three possible answers
to the problem of injustice, none of the solutions is ideal. The first seems
impossiblc without concentration camps; the second is difficult and
87. Id. at 292d-93a.
88. Id. at 293c-d.
89. Id. at 293e-94a.
90. Id. at 294a.
91. Id. at 294a-b.
92. Id. at 294c.
93. Machiavelli seems to have been so impressed by this as to eschew considerations about law
altogether. See NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE ch. XII (1532).
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potentially self-destructive; the third has the merit of realism, but necessarily
entails a lower standard. It is, however, the third option that is chosen, and
its choice determines the future course and character of the dialogue: it is
now definitely a dialogue about law that is politically more realistic than any
other Platonic treatment of politics.
94
There are, then, two drawbacks to the rule of law solution adopted by
the three interlocutors: first, the generality and abstractness of law compared
to active reason; and second, its recognition that the regime is an alloy of the
just and the unjust, the wise and the ignorant. The best regime simply would
be one in which all were wise and just. The second-best regime might be
one in which the wise and just had authority over the unwise and imperfectly
just. The rule of law is, in fact, a kind of third-best solution. 95 But an
account of this solution would be incomplete without noting what the
Athenian takes to be its distinct advantages.
The advantages are most clearly indicated in the ninth book of the Laws,
the book devoted to the exposition of the city's criminal code. The Athenian
is discussing violent offenses and calls for a preliminary statement that
emphasizes that human beings must live under laws "or they differ in no
way from the beasts that are the most savage in every way.",96 The Athenian
continues:
The cause of these things is this, that there is no one among human
beings whose nature grows so as to become adequate both to know
what is in the interest of human beings as regards a political regime
and, knowing this, to be able and willing always to do what is best.
For, in the first place, it is difficult to know that the true political art
must care not for the private but the common-for the common
binds cities together, while the private tears them apart-and that it
is in the interest of both the common and the private that the
common rather than the private, be established nobly. Secondly,
even if someone should advance sufficiently in the art to know that
this is the way these things are by nature, and after this should rule
the city without being audited, and as an autocrat, he would never
94. Accordingly, where the chief officials in Kallipolis are called "guardians" (phulakes), see
THE REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 374d, those in the Magnesian city are called "guardians of the
laws" (nomophulakes), see THE LAWS, supra note 54, at 752e. Cf id. at 715d.
95. On the Greek text, which is somewhat difficult, see I E.B. ENGLAND, THE LAWS OF PLATO
202-03 (1921). The interpretation has been much disputed. My account is closest to that found in
LEO STRAUSS, THE ARGUMENT AND THE ACTION OF PLATO'S LAws 5 (1975).
96. THE LAWS, supra note 54, at 874e-75a; cf POLITICS, supra note 67, at 1253a29-37.
645
be able to adhere to this conviction and spend his life giving priority
to nourishing what is common in the city, while nourishing the
private as following after the common; mortal nature will always
urge him toward getting more than his share and toward private
business, irrationally fleeing pain and pursuing pleasure, and putting
both of these before what is more just and better. Creating a
darkness within itself, it will completely fill both itself and the
whole city with everything bad.9'
There are two basic problems here: a problem about knowledge and a
problem about motive. There is an art of politics, a kind of expertise not
possessed by most people. This assimilates the political art to others. But
another aspect of politics is quite different: because politics concerns the
common things, those responsible for it are in a unique position to benefit
themselves, and so the Athenian holds that the need for knowledge of public
things is only one desideratum. A second assumes the knowledge but then
asks who, having such knowledge, could be trusted not to use it to benefit
himself at the expense of the common good.
The phrase translated above as "without being audited" (anupeuthunos)
refers to the Athenian practice (presumably also established in other Greek
poleis) of undertaking an investigation (called a euthuna) of office holders at
the end of their service to determine if they have done anything illicit. 98
Rule without an audit is rule without accountability and was considered by
the Greeks, including Plato and Aristotle, as tantamount to tyranny. 99 Now
recall that the city proposed in the Republic is one ruled by the wise. What
guarantee is there that the philosopher-rulers would not exploit the common
for their private benefit? The guarantee is in the nature of the philosophers
themselves: they love truth and prefer it to honor or money. The motives of
the philosophers are every bit as important as their wisdom as a qualification
for rule in the Republic.' 00
That knowledge can occur without the right motive is acknowledged in
the quotation above. Both are rare on their own; the two together are very
rare indeed. And yet, that represents an ideal. The ideal is yet more difficult
to realize for the reasons discussed above in Part I. This is the most basic
explanation for the embrace of the rule of law. We have seen the
97. THE LAWS, supra note 54, at 875a-c.
98. See MORROW, supra note 59, at 219-22; see also Marcel Pirrart, Les euthunoi athdniens, 40
L'ANTIQUITt CLASSIQUE 526 (1971); S.C. TODD, THE SHAPE OF ATHENIAN LAW 112-13 (1993).
99. Cf THE LAWS, supra note 54, at 691c-d, 761e; POLITICS, supra note 67, at 1295a20;
PSEUDO-PLATONIC DEFINITIONS 415b, e.
100. THE REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 519c-21b. Nowhere in the Republic are the philosopher-
rulers said to be anupeuthunos, although Morrow suggests that they are. See MORROW, supra note
59, at 582-83.
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justification for the rule of law as well as its disadvantages. It is also
necessary to see that the rule of law has a context in the Laws-it is
organically connected to other features of the Magnesian city that support
and condition it. Three of these features are discussed in the next section:
first, the establishment of the city itself; second, the role of persuasion and
the Athenian's introduction of the preambles to the written laws; and third,
the role of practices as an example of quasi-legal institutions that support
law. An additional institution, the "nightly meeting," is discussed in
Part II. D. What all of these features indicate is that the rule of law is a more
complicated and contextualized instrumentality than is often thought. The
rule of law does not exist on its own in isolation from other characteristics of
the city but is part of a whole that conditions it.
C. Context and Limits of the Rule of Law
In the fourth book of the Laws, the Athenian is discussing the details of
the settlement of the new city. This leads him to what initially sounds like a
very pessimistic assessment of the chances for the sort of project the three
old men are discussing. 10' He confesses that he has sometimes thought that
"no human being ever legislates anything, but that chances and accidents"
are really in command.102 Recovering from the fit of pessimism, he then
suggests that there is a god involved in the process and also-and more
importantly for present purposes-the power of art (techni), which can
cooperate with and respond to the blind force of chance. 0 3 But chance
seems to control even this, because the Athenian adds, "Along with the rest
of the good luck a land needs to have befall it if it would ever dwell in
happiness, there must always happen along, for such a city, a lawgiver who
possesses the truth."' 4 What sort of city would be in the best condition to
receive such a gift? Shockingly, the Athenian suggests that a tyranny, one in
which the tyrant were young, possessed of a good memory, good at learning,
courageous, and magnificent by nature.' 05 Such a naturally virtuous young
tyrant would most quickly and easily submit his city to the judgment of a
true lawgiver, one whom the Athenian later associates with the virtues of
prudence and moderation.' 06
101. THE LAWS, supra note 54, at 704a-08e.
102. Id. at 709a.
103. Id. at 709b-c.
104. Id. at 709c.
105. Id. at 709e-10a
106. Id. at 712a.
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The Athenian concludes this part of his discussion, saying that "when
the greatest power coincides in a human being with prudence and
moderation, then occurs the natural genesis of the best regime, and laws to
match; but otherwise it will never come to pass." 107 It is just after this that
he asks his companions what sort of regime (politeia) they should establish
for the city. 1 08 Kleinias and Megillus are unsure how to answer, and the
Athenian asks them what regime each of their cities has.'0 9 Neither is able
to say with specificity, pointing to features of their regimes that seem to
indicate a variety of types. "0 The Athenian then says that their inability to
point to one type shows that their cities are "real regimes.""' The
conventional regimes, democracy, oligarchy, etc., are really just
administrations dominated by one faction of the city-the rich, the poor, or
some other. 1 2  A real regime, the Athenian therefore suggests, is one
dedicated to the good of the whole city, but human rulers as such seem
incapable of this kind of rule. If one were to name the city for a ruler in this
sense, it should be named for a god "who truly rules as despot over those
who possess intellect." "' Kleinias asks who this god is. 114
To illustrate this and point to the sort of regime the Magnesian city
should have, the Athenian tells them a myth about the age of Kronos. 1"5 The
god Kronos, the Athenian explains, knew that "human nature is not at all
capable of regulating the human things, when it possesses autocratic
authority over everything, without becoming swollen with insolence and
injustice." 116 He took pity on human beings and sent a race of demons to
rule over them like shepherds over sheep. 117 The result was happiness for
human beings, who enjoyed "peace and awe and good laws and unstinting
justice without stint.""' 8 The Athenian concludes:
What this present argument is saying, making use of the truth,
is that there can be no rest from evils and toils for those cities in
which some mortal rules rather than a god. The argument thinks
that we should imitate by every device the way of life that is said to
107. Id.
108. Id. at 712c.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 712d-e.
111. Id. at 712e-1 3a; cf id. at 832c. For the emphasis, see ENGLAND, supra note 95, at 712e9.
112. THE LAWS, supra note 54, at 713a.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 713c-14a.
116. Id. at 713c.
117. Id. at 713c-d.
118. Id. at 713e.
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have existed under Kronos; in public life and in private life-in the
arrangement of our households and our cities-we should obey
whatever within us partakes of immortality, giving the name "law"
to the distribution ordained by intelligence. 1 9
These texts from the fourth book both reinforce the sense in which the
rule of law is a second-best approximation to the rule of intelligence and a
solution to the excesses characteristic of unfettered human freedom. They
also suggest a prerequisite for the project of the dialogue and for the rule of
law as such. Some well-disposed rulers must come into contact with a
philosopher-teacher-not a philosopher-ruler but a teacher who can assist in
the drafting of laws. This is fundamentally a matter of chance (tuchi) and,
therefore, cannot simply be produced.
The notion of a higher law, then, in the sense of divine law, also returns
via the Athenian's introduction of a myth-the myth of Kronos. This is a
kind of transmutation of the original sense of divine law with which the
three men began. The law codes of Crete and Sparta were said to be the
issue of particular gods. The Athenian stranger never directly contradicts
this. However, he very quickly suggests imperfections in those law codes
and changes the ground of the discussion to what is "by nature." Later, in
the eighth book, almost off-handedly, the Athenian suggests that gods do not
legislate at all. 120 The notion of a divine lawgiver here is discussed strictly
in terms of a myth said to reflect the truth that this law code is a product of
the only god that matters-intelligence. At the same time, the Athenian and
his interlocutors have agreed that the city will continue to claim that its laws
are made by gods. 12' One would be too quick to see this simply as an
indication of impiety or cynicism. For one thing, the classical Greeks did
not have a revelatory religion but rather a more natural one rooted in myths
never understood literally and tied to rituals that were in many cases
connected to the city itself and so a part of civic life. 12 2 It is more important
simply to see that this connection between the laws and the gods is an
119. Id. at 713e-14a.
120. Id. at 835c.
121. id. at 657a-b, 664a, 762e; cf id. at 634d-e, 716a.
122. See WALTER BURKERT, GREEK RELIGION 216-75 (John Raffan trans., 1985); Christiane
Sourvinou-Inwood, What Is Polis Religion?, in THE GREEK CITY FROM HOMER TO ALEXANDER 295
(Oswyn Murray & Simon Price eds., 1990). I have treated some of these matters at length in V.
Bradley Lewis, Gods for the City and Beyond: Civil Religion in Plato's Laws, in CIVIL RELIGION
THEN AND Now (John von Heyking & Ronald Weed eds., forthcoming 2009).
admission that the bonds of the law itself need reinforcement, that a sense of
sacredness is a crucial support.
At the same time the laws really do have their origin in the divine in so
far as the Athenian sees reason or intelligence itself as a divine thing. The
passage quoted above has two quite close parallels in other works by Plato
that suggest this. One is in the Republic:
Unless ... the philosophers rule as kings or those now called
kings and chiefs genuinely and adequately philosophize, and
political power and philosophy coincide in the same place, while the
many natures now making their way to either apart from the other
are by necessity excluded, there is no rest from ills for the cities, my
dear Glaucon, nor I think for human kind, nor will the regime we
have now described in speech ever come forth from nature, insofar
as possible, and see the light of the sun. 123
The second passage is from Plato's autobiographical Seventh Letter. 124
The letter is intended to advise the followers of Plato's friend Dion after
Dion's unsuccessful attempt to establish a reformist government in
Syracuse. Plato went to Syracuse to help with this ill-starred project and
uses the letter to explain his reasons, also giving information about his early
life and how he came to his views about politics. Plato seems to have
harbored political ambitions in Athens but abandoned them after the rough
and disorderly period following the Peloponnesian War and especially after
the execution (under the aegis of the restored democracy) of his friend
Socrates. He states his conclusions as follows:
I was forced to say, in praise of true philosophy, that from her
height alone was it possible to discern what the nature of justice is,
either in the state or in the individual, and that the ills of the human
race would never end until either those who are sincerely and truly
lovers of wisdom come into political power, or the rulers of our
cities, by the grace of God, learn true philosophy. 125
Elsewhere in the Seventh Letter, Plato makes it clear that the best
practical solution for Syracuse is a free government under the rule of law. 126
123. THE REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 473c-e.
124. PLATO, SEVENTH LETTER, in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS 1634 (Glenn R. Morrow trans.,
John M. Cooper ed., 1997) [hereinafter SEVENTH LETTER].
125. Id. at 326a-b.
126. Id. at 324b, 331d-e, 334c-d, 336a. I have discussed the teaching of the Seventh Letter in
Lewis, supra note 60.
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Shortly after the discussion of the establishment of the city, which
contains an account of the rule of law just discussed, the Athenian stranger
introduces one of the signature features of the Laws. He notes that some
things the lawgiver would wish to say "cannot be presented harmoniously in
the shape of law."' 2 7 This is important because the lawgiver should, to the
extent possible, not simply control behavior through a rule with the threat of
punishment but through persuasion. 128 This can be effected by the inclusion
of a preamble (prooimion) to legal regulations that contains an argument and
also encouraging rhetoric that attempts to induce voluntary compliance. The
legislator who includes such preambles is compared to the best sort of
physician, one who investigates an ailment "according to nature" and then
"teaches" the patient, not giving orders until he has laid a groundwork of
persuasion. 129 All the laws, the Athenian holds, should have preambles. 3°
Indeed, as the three go through the rest of the laws that will regulate the life
of the Magnesians, the Athenian usually starts with a preamble that intends
to educate and persuade. In some cases, one might conclude that the rhetoric
involved is not entirely rational. Indeed, in one case the Athenian suggests
that the citizens may have to believe things the truth of which they cannot
themselves verify. 13 1 He certainly thinks that the city's institutions should
support the laws with authoritative beliefs. The most important of these
beliefs are religious, as suggested above. The tenth book of the Laws
contains a discussion of proofs of the existence of the gods that is perhaps
the lengthiest such text in classical Greek antiquity and that is said to
constitute "our noblest and best prelude on behalf of all the laws."
1 32
In addition to persuasive preambles and a kind of civic religious
orthodoxy, there are other social supports for law. Perhaps the most
important is seen in a feature of the Laws that has been little noticed: the
127. THE LAWS, supra note 54, at 718b-c.
128. Id. at 718c-e.
129. Id. at 720a-e; see id. at 857d-59a.
130. Id. at 723b-c.
131. Id. at 660e-63a. See MORROW, supra note 59, at 557 ("Plato plainly indicates that more than
reasoning is required to bring human nature under the control of the law; hence in his preambles, he
often employs nonrational means of persuasion."); see also Andr6 Laks, The Laws, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF GREEK AND ROMAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 258, 285-90 (Christopher Rowe
& Malcolm Schofield eds., 2005). Morrow's and Lak's views are slightly different, but both seem
more defensible than that in CHRISTOPHER BOBONICH, PLATO'S UTOPIA RECAST: HIS LATER ETHICS
AND POLITICS 97-119 (2002) (taking the preambles to exemplify rational persuasion in a much fuller
sense).
132. See THE LAWS, supra note 54, at 887c.
notion of practices. The concept of a "practice" (epitideuma)133 is central to
the Athenian stranger's dialectical investigation of the Dorian political
regimes, indeed to his understanding of regimes simply, because, while most
often the question of regimes and types of regimes is dealt with in terms of
the distribution of power and the arrangement of ruling offices in a city, the
types of practices that people value are for the Athenian more central. He
begins his inquiry into the Dorian regimes not by asking who rules but rather
by asking, Which practices are pursued and why? Specifically, he asks
about barracks meals, physical training, and military tactics, and then puts
those into the larger contexts of the goods they are thought to promote,
especially those "divine goods"-the virtues. The Athenian gets around to
the question of ruling offices in the fourth book but denies that those
conventional classifications really describe regimes. But just what is a
practice?
Inherent in the etymology of epitideuma is the notion of directedness to
an end. This is in its root, epitides, which is usually defined as "according
to a plan" or "ordered to an end."'13 4 This purposive aspect is also present in
related words. 135  While the word is not uncommon in Plato, the Laws
clearly contains the heaviest use of it. 136 The Platonic use of epitideuma and
its cognates can be subdivided into two more particular meanings.137  The
first refers to particular practices and the second to practices in general.
Particular epitideumata referred to in the Platonic corpus are manifold. In
the Laws, Kleinias lists the practices that contribute to manliness as the
barracks meals, gymnastic training, hunting, fist-fighting, the "secret
service" (krupteia), 138 and the distinctive Spartan religious festivals. 139 The
133. For English translations of epitdeuma, see H.G. LIDDELL ET AL., A GREEK-ENGLISH
LEXICON, 666 (9th ed. & rev. supp. 1996) (suggesting as translations "pursuit," "business," and
"custom"). For varying Latin equivalents, see I D. FRIEDERICH ASTIUS, LEXICON PLATONICUM
800-01 (Burt Franklin 1969) (1835) (giving stadium, profession, ars, and institutum); 14 tDOUARD
DES PLACES, PLATON: OEUVRES COMPLtTES, LEXIQUE DE LA LANGUE PHILOSOPHIQUE ET
RELIGIEUSE DE PLATON (1964) (giving practique, exercise, and moeurs); CHANTRAIN, supra note
41, at 361 (giving occupation and genre de vie). I have rendered as "practice" partly because it
seems so well to fit the now famous account of a practice given by Alasdair Maclntyre: "[A]ny
coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods
internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of
excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result
that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved,
are systematically extended." ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 187 (2d ed. 1984).
134. CHANTRAIN, supra note 41, at 361 (a dessein, 6 cettefin).
135. LIDDELL ET AL, supra note 133, at s.v. epitideios, epitideusis, epitdeuein.
136. LEONARD BRANDWOOD, A WORD INDEX TO PLATO 385 (1976) (listing fifty-seven references
in the Laws and forty-four in the Republic).
137. See DES PLACES, supra note 133.
138. The krupteia, usually translated as "secret service," was the Spartan practice of periodically
assigning young warriors to terrorize the subject Helot population. See PLUTARCH, LIFE OF
LYCURGUS 28.1-4.
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first two are also listed as practices that contribute to the virtue of
moderation. 140 Other activities specifically referred to as practices later
include hunting and sumposia (drinking parties). 141 In the Republic, the
ruling activity of the guardians is called a practice and so is philosophy. 142
While Plato occasionally refers to bad epitideumata,14 1 practices are
usually associated with the development of excellence-moral education. 144
In the seventh book of the Laws, the Athenian stranger discusses "unwritten
customs" and "ancestral laws," which, while not strictly codified, are said to
be the "bonds of every regime" (desmoi pasts politeias).145 Such unwritten
customs "if nobly established and made habitual" provide a safeguard for the
written laws and support them against various stresses. 146 The Athenian tells
Kleinias that these things must not be neglected by the legislator, "neither
the great nor the small of what are called laws, habits, or practices."147 The
city, he repeats, is "bound together by all such things."' 148 Practices, then,
are linked with education and habituation, with a view to the nature and
stability of the regime as a whole. 149 The idea of practices is closely linked
with specific virtues and the virtues generally. 50
The rule of law, then, is embedded in a web of other ideas and
institutions in the Laws that make it possible and preserve its efficacy. It is
no simple thing. Moreover, in each case these supports are connected with
the ultimate superiority of the rule of reason. This is especially the case with
the last of these supports, one that is so important that the Athenian stranger
calls it a "safeguard"'' for the whole regime and does not fully discuss it
until the end of the dialogue, the "nightly meeting."
139. THE LAWS, supra note 54, at 633a-c.
140. Id. at 636a.
141. Id. at 637d, 763b, 823c, 640e, 646e, 653a, 673e.
142. THE REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 455a-b, 455d, 487a, 487d, 489c, 491 a, 494a.
143. See THE LAWS, supra note 54, at 918a, 919c-d, 919e; cf id. at 706d, 771a, 920b; SEVENTH
LETTER, supra note 124, at 326c.
144. For examples in other dialogues, see PLATO, LACHES 180a, 182c, 186d, 190e; PLATO,
MENEXENUS 249a; PLATO, PHAEDRUS 253b; PLATO, HIPPIAS MAJOR 286b.
145. THE LAWS, supra note 54, at 793b.
146. Id. at 793b-c.
147. Id. at 793c-d.
148. Id. at 793d.
149. Id. at 71 lb-c, 770d, 791c, 796e, 808e.
150. Id. at 71 Ic, 853b; cf PLATO, HIPPIAS MAJOR 294c, 298b; PLATO, PHAEDRUS 253a; THE
REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 424d, 444e, 560b; PLATO, TiMAEUS 18b, 87b.
151. THE LAWS, supra note 54, at 960d.
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D. The Nightly Meeting and the Higher Law of Reason
Following the passage from the ninth book on the inability of
unrestrained human beings to rule justly, the Athenian adds the following:
Of course, if ever some human being who was bom adequate in
nature, with a divine dispensation, were able to attain these things,
he wouldn't need any laws ruling over him. For no law or order is
stronger than knowledge, nor is it right for intelligence to be
subordinate, or a slave, to anyone, but it should be ruler over
everything, if indeed it is true and really free according to nature.
But now, in fact, it is so nowhere or in any way, except to a small
extent. That is why one must choose what comes second, order and
law-which see and look to most things, but are incapable of seeing
everything. 152
We see here again the superiority and natural freedom of intelligence
and the limit (its restricted vision) of the rule of law, which is here said
explicitly to be "second" (to deuteron). The true and free rule of reason is
said to exist "nowhere or in any way, except to a small extent" (kata
brachu).'53 We can read this last phrase as a kind of general hedge. The
rule of intellect certainly survives in most regimes if only in a radically
truncated form. A completely rule-governed or routinized arrangement
would likely be too brittle to meet emergent necessities and unanticipated
crises. Perhaps ancient Egypt provides an example of an attempt at such a
thing, but there does not seem much appetite for it in the modem world. 154
But the "small extent" here may refer also to a particular feature of the
regime proposed in the Laws itself.
The Athenian introduces in the tenth book and explains in greater detail
in the twelfth a body called the "nightly meeting" (nukterinos sullogos).1'
In the twelfth book, the Athenian refers to the meeting as a "safeguard
[(sotria)] of the regime and laws."' 15 6 It is composed of the highest officials
152. Id. at 875c-d.
153. Id. at 875d (emphasis added).
154. Consider the Athenian's remarks about Egypt. Id. at 656d-57d, 660c; cf John A. Wilson,
Egypt, in THE INTELLECTUAL ADVENTURE OF ANCIENT MAN 31, 62-92 (1946).
155. This body is usually rendered in English as the "nocturnal council." Luc Brisson has argued
for Collkge de veille as a more appropriate name. Luc Brisson, Le College de veille (nukterinds
stllogos), in PLATO'S LAWS AND ITS HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE: SELECTED PAPERS OF THE I
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON ANCIENT THOUGHT 161 (Francisco L. Lisi ed., 2001). 1 have
proposed and argued for the name "nightly meeting" and discussed the nature and significance of
this body in greater detail in V. Bradley Lewis, The Nocturnal Council and Platonic Political
Philosophy, 19 HIST. POL. THOUGHT I (1998).
156. THE LAWS, supra note 54, at 960d-e.
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of the city and select younger men invited by the members and is said to
meet in the very early morning, before dawn. 157 The body is charged in the
tenth book with instructing public heretics. In the twelfth book, its brief is
more extensive and includes consideration of improvements in the city's
laws, investigation of foreign legal customs, and "whatever branches of
learning [that] might seem to contribute to this inquiry."' 158  Later these
inquiries are described as more clearly philosophical: they must study the
nature and unity of the virtues and arguments for the existence of the
gods.159 The Athenian says this meeting is to be like the intellect or mind
(nous) of the city. 160
Some have interpreted the introduction of the nightly meeting at the end
of the Laws as a kind of repudiation of the ideal of the rule of law so clearly
embodied in most of the dialogue. They see it as a kind of last minute return
to the ideal of the Republic, with the meeting constituting a thinly veiled
return of the philosopher-king. 161 I have argued for the consistency of the
meeting with the overall aim of the Laws elsewhere. 162 The description
given of the body suggests that it functions not as an official organ of the
city with explicit powers but more like a body constituted for thinking and
advice. Its members have specific responsibilities, and their execution of
those duties could well be influenced by the body's meetings and
discussions, but it does not seem to have distinctive corporate powers. 163 In
this sense it is a return to the ideal of the Republic, albeit not one that
contradicts the teaching of the Laws. It institutionalizes the presence of
philosophy in the city or, at least, an image or approximation of philosophy.
In so doing it aims to mitigate or manage the natural tensions between
philosophy and the city, and create a space for the freedom of intelligence
within a context of the rule of law.164 This has two purposes that, again,
157. Id at 951d.
158. Id. at951e-52b.
159. Id. at 965d-67a.
160. Id. at961d.
161. See, e.g., ERNEST BARKER, GREEK POLITICAL THEORY: PLATO AND HIS PREDECESSORS 406,
408 n.1 (1918); GEORGE H. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 85 (rev. ed. 1950); P.A.
BRUNT, STUDIES IN GREEK HISTORY AND THOUGHT 250-51 (1993); George Klosko, The Nocturnal
Council in Plato's Laws, 36 POL. STUD. 74 (1988).
162. See Lewis, supra note 155.
163. Id. at 19 n.62.
164. While much of the Laws suggests a law code that is static and unchanging, the Athenian
stranger does indicate that some matters requiring regulation are left to be completed by the
Guardians of the Laws themselves, and also that laws can be changed, although the procedure is
sufficiently complicated so as to discourage change that isn't thought absolutely beneficial and
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reflect the natural tension just mentioned. There is an explicitly political
purpose, that of remedying the deficiencies that flow from the strict rule of
law through inquiry and deliberation about improvements. 165 It is also,
however, directed beyond politics and reflects the pure activity of intellect
itself in philosophy.
This device is the closest Plato gets to suggesting anything like a
resolution of the tensions I have noted between man's rational and political
nature, a tension that was for him most immediately present in the example
and fate of Socrates. The Republic represents a city in which philosophy
rules-a city that is, as much as possible, philosophical. The Laws
represents a city closer to those actually existing but with express provision
that philosophy exist within it in such a way that it might influence political
practice to some extent. If the nightly meeting did nothing else, it would be
important only for this reason. I think it is this aspect that Aristotle points to
in his somewhat cryptic statement about the Magnesian city in the Politics
that "which in spite of his wish to make it more acceptable to states, he
gradually brings back round to the other constitution." 166
III. FROM PLATO TO ARISTOTLE AND BEYOND
For Plato, then, the rule of law is explicitly related as image to ideal to
the rule of intelligence. For Plato, the measure of truth is a complicated
question related to his doctrine of the forms or ideas, something I cannot go
into here. But it is worth remarking that the Platonic idea moves through the
Western philosophical tradition via Augustine's replacement of the forms
into the mind of God, which in turn informs Thomas Aquinas's conception
of the lex aeterna, rational participation in which is his definition of the lex
naturalis, thus establishing a connection between the Platonic account of the
rule of law and that of the medieval natural law tradition and of the rule of
law to the higher law.
The link between Plato and Aquinas was Aristotle, whose account of the
rule of law resembles his relationship with his great teacher in other
respects: what Aristotle presents is a somewhat tidier account that still
preserves some of the dialogical quality and philosophical open-endedness
of the original. Aristotlc assigns great importance to law itself, more than
most moral philosophers (the great exception being Thomas Hobbes, for
necessary. See THE LAWS, supra note 54, at 769d-71a, 772a, 818e, 828b, 834d-e, 835a, 846b-c,
957a-b, 968c; see also David Cohen, Law, Autonomy, and Political Community in Plato's Laws, 88
CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY 301 (1993).
165. Moreover, the educational effect of the activity of the nightly meeting on its participants may
well inform their interpretations of the laws they must administer in virtue of their status as
magistrates.
166. POLITICS, supra note 67, at 1265al-4.
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whom positive law is morality). This is largely due to the fact that for
Aristotle the city is so important. The city is the condition that allows
human beings to flourish, a condition sine qua non for the human good
itself-so much so that Aristotle names the science of which moral inquiry
forms a crucial part "a sort of political science."' 167 In the very important
fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle holds that justice in a
political community "belongs to those who have law in their relations.'
' 68
Later in that fifth book, he defines the virtue of justice as lawfulness and also
writes that justice is "complete virtue." 16 9 This is because for Aristotle law
has an essentially moral-educational purpose:
[T]he law instructs us to do the actions of a brave person-for
instance, not to leave the battle-line, or to flee, or to throw away our
weapons; of a temperate person-not to commit adultery or wanton
aggression; of a mild person-not to strike or revile another; and
similarly requires actions in accord with the other virtues, and
prohibits actions in accord with the vices. The correctly established
law does this correctly, and the less carefully framed one does this
worse. 170
Later, in the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle repeats
what he said in the very first book, that one acquires the beginning of virtues
through habituation and that crucial to right habituation is growing up under
the right laws.171 Law sets the pursuits one engages in so as to cultivate
good character. This is especially important for the young, but not only the
young, because Aristotle holds that such legal tutelage is necessary for the
whole of one's life. '
72
At the same time, Aristotle is just as aware as Plato of the law's
limitations. In the fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle proposes
the virtue of "equity" (epieikeia) as a remedy for the problem. Aristotle
writes that "all law is universal [(katholou)], but in some areas no universal
rule can be correct."'7 3 Knowing this, the law chooses the rule that holds
167. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 40, at 1094b 11.
168. Id. at 1134a30.
169. Id. at 1129a33-29b30.
170. Id. at 1129b20-25.
171. Id. at 1179b31-32.
172. Id. at 1179b32-80a4.
173. Id. at 1137b14-15. For an exposition and defense of Aristotle's notion related to
contemporary notions of equity, see Erie G. Zahnd, The Application of Universal Laws to Particular
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good most of the time. When such a rule meets a particular circumstance
such that its application would result in injustice, the virtue of equity allows
one to see that it should not be applied or that some remedy should be
provided. This would be seen by and agreed to by the legislator himself
were he present. Equity, then, is defined as "the rectification of law insofar
as the universality of law makes it deficient." 174
The matter is discussed in the context of justice, but it has its origin in a
more methodological point. In the very first book of the Nicomachean
Ethics, Aristotle writes that the political art, under which he includes ethics,
concerns the noble, just, and good things, but that opinion about these things
differs so much that many people believe the good to be only a product of
law or custom and not to be grounded in nature."' Aristotle, however,
thinks they are rooted in nature. 176 The evident variability in human affairs,
however, he does accept, holding that its basis is in the role of the
individual's perception of the good, itself conditioned by his upbringing and
general moral formation. 177 There is such a wide continuum in this that
differences of opinion about ethics and politics are endemic. There is
another source of variation simply in the wide variety in human affairs, a
variety that limits the possible specificity of generalizations, which he
characterizes as "rough outlines" that hold "good usually."'178 This is so
much the case that Aristotle frequently declines to state any rule or
generalization but simply refers to what the "prudent" or "mature" man
would do. 1
79
The relationship of Aristotle's understanding to that of Plato in the
Republic is most evident in the third book of the Politics. Aristotle asks
whether it is more advantageous "to be ruled by the best man" or "the best
laws."' 80 The rule of the best man is the only rational basis for kingship.
The chief argument in its favor is that "laws speak only of the universal and
do not give commands relative to the actual circumstances." '' In answering
the objection, Aristotle notes that rulers must have a "reasoned account of
the universal," but unlike the law, they also "have the passionate element"
(to pathitikon), from which law is free. 8 2 The discussion is on the whole
Cases: .4 Defense of Equity in Aristotelianism aid Anglo-American Law, 59 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1996, at 263.
174. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 40, at 11 37b26-27.
175. Id. at 1094b14-16.
176. Id. at 1134b24-33.
177. Id. at 1095b4-8, 1113a15-b2, 1114a31-b16.
178. Id. at 1094b20-21.
179. See, e.g., id at l106b36-07a2 (defining virtue); see also ERIC VOEGELIN, What Is Right by
Nature, in ANAMNESIS 55, 61-70 (Gerhart Niemeyer ed. & trans., 1978).
180. POLITICS, supra note 67, at 1286a7-8.
181. Id. at 1286a9-11.
182. Id. at 1286a16-18.
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dialogical in character. Its resolution, if such it can be called, is that law
should rule. Indeed, Aristotle-following Plato, no doubt-holds that
political officials should be called "guardians and servants of the laws."'
183
However, where the law fails by virtue of its universality, human judges
should fill in the gap. The innovation Aristotle suggests at this point is that a
more democratic regime is likely to better fulfill this need since distorting
individual passions would be diluted. He also, however, expects the judge
or magistrates to have already been educated by the laws in such a way as to
have internalized their spirit. He concludes:
Then again, whatever the law appears unable to determine
could not be discovered by a human being either. Rather the law,
having educated rulers for such eventualities, hands over to them, to
be managed and decided by their most just opinion, the things it
leaves out. It allows them, further, to set things right wherever, as a
result of experience, they deem something else to be better than the
existing laws. Now, anyone who bids the law to rule seems to bid
god and intellect alone to rule, but anyone who bids a human being
to rule adds on also the wild beast. For desire is such a beast, and
spiritedness perverts rulers even when they are the best of men.
Hence law is intellect without appetite. 1
84
Aristotle's formulations here are quite close to those we saw earlier in
Plato's Laws. Intellect is compared to god and that element alone is
preserved in the law free from the potential distortions of emotion and
interest.
It is by way of Aristotle that this view makes its way, in a somewhat
more muted form, into the thought of Aquinas, who is so influential for later
natural law jurisprudence. In discussing the justification for framing human
laws, Aquinas considers some objections drawn from Aristotle to the effect
that the particular judgment of wise men is better than law.' 85 He answers
with three points: it is easier to find a small number of wise men to frame
laws than the large number needed to continually render particular
judgments; framers of law can take a long view unconstrained by the
pressure to settle a particular pressing case; framers are removed from the
183. Id. at 1287a21-22; see 3 W.L. NEWMAN, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 293 (1902);
MORROW, supra note 59, at 214.
184. POLITICS, supra note 67, at 1287a23-32.
185. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA lallae, q. 95.
objects of the laws they make and therefore less potentially affected by
passion and interest. 8 6 Later, in his discussion of human law, Aquinas
specifically raises the issues discussed by Aristotle in his treatment of the
virtue of equity-the inadequacy of general rules to the wide variety of
human particulars. He acknowledges this, holding that, in general, laws are
the necessary basis but that individuals can be dispensed from them in cases
where the common good would be better served.17 But for Aquinas these
problems are not about law as such but about the limits of human positive
law. Their remedy is found by reference to the natural law, itself explicitly
connected to the eternal law, which is God's providential government of the
universe and a product of God as the source and measure of reason itself.'88
In Aquinas, then, the rule of law is rooted very clearly in the higher law
in the fullest sense. For Aquinas, the political theologian, law, and indeed
all human institutions, are placed in the context of divine reason, in the full
order of providence and cannot be fully understood apart from that. 189 Much
of this context could be assumed in a thoroughly Christian civilization. Our
own considerably more secular order still values the rule of law, but absent
the earlier context, one wonders how it can be best and most fully
understood and effected. At the beginning of this paper I pointed to
questions about various contemporary efforts in this respect. The Platonic
account of the rule of law suggests a similar embededness of the rule of law
in a different (pre-Christian) sort of context, but one that is perhaps as
unfamiliar as that of Saint Thomas.
By suggesting this unfamiliarity my aim is not to doubt the efficacy of
the rule of law in our time, but rather to indicate the richer theoretical
context of the classical theory and thereby question whether we have lost
important elements of the idea of the rule of law. The point of confronting
the classical account is to return to our own ways with a broader view and
new questions. This may lead us to doubt the adequacy of the modern
understanding, but it need not diminish the attraction of the ideal.
186. See id. at q. 95, art. 1, ad2.
187. See id. at q. 96, art. 6; cf id. at q. 97, art. 7; see JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL,
AND LEGAL THEORY 216-17 (1998).
188. See id. at q. 93, art. 1.
189. See RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE: REDISCOVERING NATURAL LAW IN A POST-
CHRISTIAN WORLD 3-37 (2003); STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY (2004).
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